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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001422

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SUBJECT: MINDEF DULIME CONVEYS SECURITY CONCERNS TO
AMBASSADOR

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (a), (b) and (d)

¶11. (S) SUMMARY: Minister of Defense Sadoun al-Dulime called on Ambassador to discuss his concerns with the "terrorist-controlled" highway between Baghdad and Amman and the 8,750 Iraqi security detail personnel currently being paid out of MoD's budget. Dulime also took this opportunity to caution against the wholesale integration of militia into the ISF. When Ambassador asked for his views on the recent selection of Maliki as Prime Minister-designate, Dulime responded that he is not optimistic about the next government. Although he believes Maliki to be a hard worker, Dulime is not sure that Maliki (whom Dulime feels is far too sectarian) will be able to bridge the sectarian divide that Dulime views as ripping the country apart. Dulime mentioned that he and other senior Iraqi and regional leaders are developing a proposal for a regional dialogue between Sunni and Shia leaders that would aim to address the rising sectarian tension. END SUMMARY.

SECURING THE BAGHDAD-AMMAN HIGHWAY

¶12. (S) On April 27, Dulime presented Ambassador with a MoD-drafted proposal to secure the highway running between Baghdad and Amman through Al Anbar Province. Dulime asserted that securing this roadway should be a top priority, as it is currently controlled by terrorists and used by them to smuggle their weapons and fighters. When asked if the MoI highway patrol is deployed along any part of this route, Dulime said not at all and that "special forces" should be deployed immediately to address the problem. Dulime assured Ambassador that he has discussed the problem with both GEN George Casey and LTG Martin Dempsey and that they have copies of the proposal.

THE IRAQI PSD PROBLEM

¶13. (S) Dulime is concerned with the 8,750 Iraqi Personal Security Detail employees (PSDs) that are currently paid by MoD. He believes his Ministry's budget should not be responsible for their salaries, especially since he has no contact with them and no authority over them. He also mentioned his alarm with the high numbers of PSDs insisted upon by many Iraqi officials. As examples he pointed out that Ghazi al-Yawir has about 800 PSDs and Ahmed Chalabi is provided about 900. Ambassador concurred that reform is necessary and that he would discuss the issue with LTG Dempsey.

MILITIA INTEGRATION INTO ISF

¶4. (S) Dulime cautioned against the wholesale integration of militias into ISF. He specifically is concerned with Prime Minister-designate Nuri al-Maliki's recent proclamation to carry out CPA Order 91. Ambassador stressed that militias must be dealt with soonest and that integration into the ISF should be a critical part of the overall strategy. However, Ambassador emphasized that any proposal for integration must be developed and implemented with great care. Ambassador went on to state that the recent proposal submitted by Badr Organization General Secretary Hadi al-Amiri on April 23 to Dulime, Interior Minister Jabr, and LTG Dempsey, which calls for the integration of all 8000-9000 Badr Corps members into the ISF, is on hold until further notice. He said the proposal needs to be thoroughly reviewed and would be an agenda item at the next Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS). Dulime agreed this is a good idea.

DULIME THOUGHTS ON PM-DESIGNATE

¶5. (S) When Ambassador asked for his views on PM-designate Nuri al-Maliki, Dulime was not very forthcoming. He began his reply by stating that he is not optimistic about Iraq's future. As for Maliki, he knows him well and believes he is a hard working person. But Dulime stressed that Maliki has not shown he is above sectarian politics, as he has put a lot of pressure on Dulime to fill the MoD with SCIRI/DAWA members. Dulime also is leery of Maliki's motives given his past statements that he believes the MoD needs restructuring.
(NOTE: In a meeting with LTG Dempsey prior to the selection of Maliki as PM-designate, Dulime stressed that, if Maliki

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were selected, the USG should not hesitate to push back. Dulime stressed that Maliki is too extreme and would completely reorganize the MoD without consultations and to its detriment. END NOTE.)

¶6. (S) COMMENT: MinDef Dulime's concerns are not new but have been a subject of discussion with Coalition leaders for some time. Dulime is deeply concerned with rising ethno-sectarian strife. He has little, if any, faith in the principal Iraqi political leaders and believes the terrorists are not being dealt with as aggressively as they should be. It seems that, in the past couple of months as it has become increasingly evident that he will not remain as MinDef, Dulime is more vocal about his frustrations and more aggressive in getting his concerns and proposals passed to Coalition leaders. END COMMENT.
KHALILZAD